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       Attorney for Respondent 
________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
POLLAK, District Judge.   
 Before us is a petition from the United States for a 
writ of mandamus or prohibition directed to the Honorable John W. 
Bissell, United States District Judge for the District of New 
Jersey.  The government's petition arises out of a pretrial order 
entered in a criminal tax fraud case against Victor Wexler which 
is to be tried before Judge Bissell.   The order adopted a jury 
instruction on "genuine indebtedness" that, in the government's 
view, undermines a well-settled prohibition against deducting 
interest payments resulting from "sham transactions" -- i.e. 
transactions entered into with no purpose other than to generate 
tax benefits.  The government argues that the instruction adopted 
by the district court is clearly erroneous under settled law, and 
that the government will be unable to proceed with the present 
prosecution and will be severely prejudiced in other tax fraud 
prosecutions if the order remains in force.  Wexler, responding 
to the petition0, contends that the proposed instruction is a 
proper statement of the law and that, in any event, the 
extraordinary appellate intrusion on trial court proceedings 
                                                           
0In formal terms, the judge of the district court is the person 
to whom the petition for mandamus is directed.  But the defendant 
in the underlying criminal prosecution is of course the real 
party in interest.  Accordingly, the caption of this case 
characterizes Victor Wexler as "respondent" and Judge Bissell as 
"nominal respondent". 
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sought by the government is unwarranted.  We conclude that the 
petition should be granted. 
 
Background  
 Between 1980 and 1985, the defendant in the underlying 
tax prosecution, Victor Wexler, served first as chief financial 
officer and subsequently as managing partner of McMahan, Brafman, 
Morgan & Co. ("MBM"), a limited partnership engaged in securities 
trading.  Wexler was initially indicted on March 19, 1992. 
Subsequently a superseding indictment was filed.  The superseding 
indictment consists of eight counts, and charges Wexler with, 
under count 1, conspiring (i) to defraud the United States by 
obstructing the lawful government functions of the I.R.S. in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and (ii) to aid and assist in the 
preparation of false tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. 
§7206(2); under count 2, aiding and assisting in the preparation 
of a U.S. Partnership Income Return, Form 1065, for MBM, for 
calendar year 1984, which falsely represented that MBM had 
incurred a loss of $75,491,898, in violation of 26 U.S.C. 
§7206(2); under count 8, making and subscribing a joint 
individual income tax return, Form 1040, falsely representing 
that Wexler was entitled to a deduction of $103,928 flowing from 
his MBM partnership interest, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 
7206(1); under counts 3-7, aiding and assisting in the 
preparation by others of joint individual income tax returns, 
Form 1040, falsely representing that the taxpayers were entitled 
to deductions flowing from their MBM partnership interests, in 
4 
violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2).  Superseding Indictment, 
Appendix ("App.") at 5-21.  The superseding indictment alleges 
that Wexler created over $160 million in fraudulent tax 
deductions for the MBM partnership from 1982 through 1986.  
According to the superseding indictment, the allegedly fraudulent 
deductions were the product of financial arrangements known as 
"repo to maturity" transactions.   
 "Repo" transactions:  In order to be able to parse the 
charges against Wexler one needs to have a general understanding 
of what "repo" transactions are and how they work.  In its brief 
in this court, as in its submissions to the district court, the 
government has described and provided examples of such 
transactions and their mechanics.  Government Br. at 5-15.  Since 
Wexler's brief does not quarrel with the government's exposition, 
we rely upon that exposition in this section of this opinion. 
 The word "repo" is an abbreviation for "repurchase 
agreement", the name given to a type of transaction commonly 
employed by firms dealing in government securities.  The 
transaction -- which may be consummated in a matter of days but 
may also span weeks or even a few months -- is a sale of 
government securities, such as treasury notes, by one securities 
dealer to another, followed by their repurchase at a later date. 
But what is in form a sale and repurchase turns out in fact to 
constitute a loan for which the securities, during the interval 
between sale and repurchase, stand as collateral.  An example may 
serve to illustrate how such a transaction works: 
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 Firm A sells Treasury notes with a face value of 
$1,000,000 to Firm B; the price paid by B to A -- the "repo 
principal" -- is a negotiated figure presumably geared to the 
market value of the notes at the date of sale; A concurrently 
contracts with B to buy the notes back at the same price at an 
agreed future date -- e.g. thirty days or sixty days hence --
which is earlier than the maturity date of the notes; on that 
future date B returns the securities to A, A repays the repo 
principal, and A also pays "repo interest", a sum negotiated 
along with the repo principal at the outset of the transaction, 
and presumably geared to the short-term interest rate then 
governing loans for the particular time-period -- thirty days, or 
sixty days, or whatever -- covered by the transaction.   
 The extent to which the "repo" turns out to be 
financially advantageous to A depends on what happens, during the 
course of the transaction, to (a) the market value of the 
securities, and (b) short-term interest rates.  A hopes that, at 
the transaction's closing date, the reacquired securities will be 
worth more and short-term interest rates will be lower than when 
the transaction began.  Under that fortunate combination of 
circumstances A would have the capability of entering into a 
second repo on substantially more favorable terms than the 
first.0 
                                                           
0A might, of course, prefer to (a) sell the securities and 
harvest the gain, or (b) hold the securities with an eye to a 
further rise in market value. 
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 The particular repo just described is one in which, as 
already noted, the transaction terminates on a date, agreed upon 
by the parties, which is earlier than the maturity date of the 
securities.  That transaction is called an "open repo".  If the 
repo's date of termination is the maturity date -- the date on 
which the Treasury pays to the securities-holder the face value 
of the securities plus accrued coupon interest -- the transaction 
is called a "repo-to-maturity".  This litigation involves the tax 
consequences of repo-to-maturity transactions. 
 At its commencement a repo-to-maturity looks like an 
open repo, in the sense that A (a) transfers its Treasury 
securities to B in exchange for an agreed sum of repo principal 
and (b) promises that at the maturity date it will pay B an 
agreed amount of interest.  But at that point the resemblance to 
an open repo ends.  For, in a repo-to-maturity, A will not, at 
the maturity date, recover the securities it has transferred to 
B.  The securities will have matured, and in lieu thereof B will 
pay A what the Treasury owes B as securities-holder -- namely, 
the face value of the securities plus the accrued coupon 
interest.  
 In contrast with the open repo, in which A's profit or 
loss turns on what happens to the market value of the securities 
and to short-term interest rates while the transaction is 
pending, the repo-to-maturity dictates ex ante the payout at 
maturity.  Indeed, from a profitability perspective A has no 
occasion to enter into a repo-to-maturity unless the coupon 
interest A will receive at maturity exceeds the interest it will, 
7 
at the inception of a repo-to-maturity, have to obligate itself 
to pay to B at maturity.  If coupon interest is equal to or less 
than the market interest rate prevailing at the time A is 
considering a repo-to-maturity, A would normally eschew the repo-
to-maturity and either (a) hold the securities until they mature, 
or (b) sell them outright.   
 In this case, the government alleges that MBM, the firm 
of which defendant Wexler was, variously, chief financial officer 
and managing partner, entered into numerous repo-to-maturity 
transactions, designed by Wexler, in which MBM agreed to pay out, 
and in fact did pay out, more in market interest than it received 
in coupon interest.  Moreover, according to the government's 
allegations, it was part of Wexler's design that his firm 
purchase the securities and "repo" them simultaneously.  The 
entire purpose of the transaction, so the government contends, 
was to create interest expenses that could, for tax purposes, be 
treated as a cost of business to be offset against profits from 
other transactions.0 
 Key to the effectuation of the scheme as described by 
the government was that the repo-to-maturity period was 
constructed to span two tax years.  In the hypothetical example 
proffered by the government to the district court, and renewed in 
its brief to this court, the three-month repo-to-maturity 
                                                           
0The repo interest rate was set at .01% above the 6.0% coupon 
interest rate, thus yielding the repo lender -- the other party 
to the repo -- a quite modest return (which the government 
characterizes as a "fee", Petition for Writ of Mandamus or 
Prohibition, at 3) for cooperating in establishing the repo. 
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transaction would run from November 1 in the first tax year, the 
date on which the securities were purchased and immediately 
repoed, to February 1 in the second tax year, the date on which 
the securities were to mature.  This calendar arrangement would 
make it possible for the interest owed in November and December 
to be treated as a deductible expense in the first tax year, 
while the November-December-January coupon interest -- partially 
offset by the January interest payment -- would not need to be 
reported as income until the second tax year.  Although in the 
aggregate two months of interest deductions in the first tax year 
would appear to be balanced by two months of interest income in 
the second tax year, the apparent symmetry is illusory from a 
revenue standpoint: it would not be until the filing of the 
return for the second tax year that the government would recoup 
the taxes not paid in the first tax year, with the result that 
the government would for a year lose the use of the sum 
ultimately recouped.0 
 In sum, the government contends that the repo-to-
maturity device illustrated above was the centerpiece of a 
conspiracy in which, according to ¶ 9 of the superseding 
indictment, Wexler and others undertook, between 1982 and 1986, 
"to generate more than $740 million ($740,000,000) in fraudulent 
interest expenses chargeable to MBM", which "fraudulent expenses 
were in turn used by WEXLER and his co-conspirators to create 
                                                           
0Conversely, the taxpayer would, of course, gain the value of 
having the use of that money for the additional year. 
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more than $160 million ($160,000,000) in bogus tax deductions for 
the partners of MBM." 
 The November 30, 1993 Order:  In October, 1993, the 
government moved for a declaration of various principles of tax 
law in order to preclude certain defenses that prosecutors 
anticipated from Wexler.  The government's motion contained the 
following proposed jury instruction: 
I instruct you that, if [the government securities 
transactions in this case] were sham transactions, then 
interest and other expenses that MBM incurred as a 
result of the transactions were not deductible. Whether 
or not the transactions were shams is a question that 
is for you to decide.  I instruct you, however, that 
you must find the transactions were sham transactions 
if you determine two things beyond a reasonable doubt: 
 
First, that MBM had no business purpose for entering 
into the transactions other than to obtain tax 
benefits; and 
 
Second, that there was no reasonable possibility that 
MBM could earn a profit on the transactions apart from 
tax benefits. 
 Defendant also proposed a jury charge to the court, 
which included the following instruction: 
Assuming the Government has proven that the 
governmental security trades were sham transactions 
(i.e. no business purpose and devoid of economic 
substance), you cannot convict the defendant if you 
find that the interest expenses at issue were the 
product of a "genuine indebtedness".  In other words, 
regardless of any conclusions you reach as to the 
motivation of the defendant or the lack of economic 
substance, the existence of a genuine debt between MBM 
and its trading partners, will permit the deduction of 
interest.  Under the tax laws, even a sham transaction 
may have elements that have economic substance, and 
these elements of the transaction must be respected for 
tax purposes.  Accordingly, if you find that the 
financing agreement to purchase the government 
securities is genuine and enforceable, the interest may 
be deducted. 
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 In its November 30, 1993, Order the district court 
adopted an instruction on sham transactions to be delivered to 
the jury.  The court's instruction adopted both parties' central 
suggestions, including the "genuine indebtedness" paragraph, 
above, proposed by defendant.  The court's instruction, in 
relevant part, is as follows: 
 I instruct you that, if these transactions in 
government securities were sham transactions, then 
interest and other expenses that MBM incurred as a 
result of the transactions were not deductible, with 
certain exceptions I will explain in a moment.  Whether 
or not the transactions were economic shams is a 
question that is for you to decide.  I instruct you, 
however, that you must find the transactions were sham 
transactions if you determine two things beyond a 
reasonable doubt: 
 
First, that MBM had no business purpose for 
entering into the transactions other than to 
obtain tax benefits; and 
 
Second, that there was no economic substance to 
the transaction, that is there was no reasonable 
possibility that MBM could earn a profit on the 
transactions apart from tax benefits. 
 
*   *   * 
 
Genuine Indebtedness 
 
 Assuming the government has proven that the 
governmental security trades were sham transactions 
(i.e. no business purpose and devoid of economic 
substance), you may convict the defendant on the count 
you are considering only if you find that the interest 
expenses at issue were not the product of a "genuine 
indebtedness."  In other words, regardless of any 
conclusions you reach as to the motivation of the 
defendant or the lack of economic substance in any 
transaction as a whole, the existence of a genuine debt 
between MBM and a trading partner, could permit the 
deduction of interest under the Internal Revenue Code. 
Under the tax laws, even an economic sham transaction 
may give rise to genuine indebtedness and could 
generate lawful interest deductions.   
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 Genuine indebtedness exists if the parties 
intended to create and enforce a binding obligation on 
the part of MBM to pay interest on a loan.  In 
determining whether genuine indebtedness exists in a 
particular transaction, you must consider the substance 
of the transaction, as intended by the parties, not 
only the form that the transaction took.  You may 
consider all relevant evidence bearing on the parties' 
intent.  Among your duties as jurors, you must 
carefully analyze the evidence applicable to each count 
to see if one or more obligations generating a genuine 
indebtedness with actual, deductible interest was or 
was not present.  The government must prove the lack of 
genuine indebtedness beyond a reasonable doubt. 
District court Order of November 30, 1993. 
 The government objected to the district court's order, 
and moved for reargument.  The district court denied the motion 
and similarly denied a stay of trial while the government 
petitioned this court for mandamus or prohibition.  We 
subsequently granted a stay pending decision on the petition. 
 The government seeks the extraordinary relief of 
mandamus or prohibition (which we will, hereafter, treat simply 
as a petition for mandamus) because it contends that (1) the 
district court's announced jury instruction on genuine 
indebtedness is clear legal error; (2) the government will be 
unable to proceed to trial in good faith within the rubric of 
that instruction and will, therefore, have to move to dismiss the 
indictment; (3) the error is unappealable; and (4) the district 
court's ruling, if allowed to stand, will affect other cases by 
virtue of setting an erroneous rule that makes tax cases 
involving sham transactions far more difficult to prosecute. 
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 Resolution of the petition before us hinges upon two 
questions:  First, is the instruction on genuine indebtedness 
contained in the district court's November 30, 1993, Order 
clearly erroneous?  Second, if the answer to the first question 
is "yes", is the error one whose probable consequences meet the 
strict standard for granting a writ of mandamus? 
 
The proposed instruction    
 The government's principal argument is that the 
district court's November 30, 1993, Order adopts an instruction 
that is patently contrary to the law.  Specifically, the 
government argues that economic sham transactions cannot generate 
lawful deductions of interest expense, even if they involve the 
payment of interest on "genuine indebtedness".  Gov't Br. at 27.  
 1) General rule on sham transactions:  The general rule 
on sham transactions in this circuit is well-established: "If a 
transaction is devoid of economic substance . . . it simply is 
not recognized for federal taxation purposes, for better or for 
worse.  This denial of recognition means that a sham transaction, 
devoid of economic substance, cannot be the basis for a 
deductible loss."  Lerman v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 939 F.2d 
44, 45 (3rd Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1940 (1992). 
Lerman reflects the fundamental and long-standing rule that 
taxation depends on the substance, not the form, of transactions. 
See e.g. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935).   
 Where a transaction has no substance other than to 
create deductions, the transaction is disregarded for tax 
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purposes.  Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 366 (1960); 
Demartino v. Commissioner, 862 F.2d 400, 401 (2nd Cir. 1988). 
Deductions for expenses resulting from such transactions are not 
permitted.  James v. Commissioner, 899 F.2d 905, 908 n.4 (10th 
Cir. 1990) ("transactions lacking an appreciable effect, other 
than tax reduction, on a taxpayer's beneficial interest will not 
be recognized for tax purposes"); Yosha v. Commissioner, 861 F.2d 
494, 499 (7th Cir. 1988) (where transactions "were devices whose 
only possible or contemplated effect was to avoid taxes, and a 
fortiori they were not engaged in for profit", resulting 
deductions violate the tax code).   
 Wexler does not challenge the sham-transaction doctrine 
in general.  Rather, Wexler argues that the doctrine does not 
apply to deduction of interest payments pursuant to § 1630 of the 
tax code if the taxpayer's obligation to pay the interest is 
binding and enforceable.  Wexler grounds his arguments in both 
the statute and the case law.  First, he argues that § 163 
differs from other sections of the code by not requiring that the 
underlying transaction be motivated by profit.  Second, he argues 
that a modern trend in the case law favors allowing deductibility 
of genuine debt, even when related to a sham transaction.  We 
address these arguments in order. 
 2) Deductibility under § 163:  Section 163(a) of the 
Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 163(a), states that "[t]here 
shall be allowed as a deduction all interest paid or accrued 
                                                           
026 U.S.C. § 163, see infra. 
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within the taxable year on indebtedness."0  Wexler argues that 
"[i]n contrast to other sections of the Internal Revenue Code 
allowing for deductions, Section 163 does not require any profit 
motive or the conduct of a trade or business in order to claim 
the deduction for interest expense."  Respondent's Br. at 20. The 
apparent thrust of the argument is that, unlike deductions taken 
pursuant to other sections of the Code, deductions under §163 are 
permitted for interest obligations resulting from sham 
transactions, so long as those obligations are "genuine" -- i.e. 
binding and enforceable. 
 It is true, as Wexler argues, that other code sections 
expressly require that the deductions they provide for arise from 
transactions having a business purpose or profit motive, whereas 
§ 163 does not.0  Nonetheless, the case law construing § 163 
clearly establishes that the sham transaction doctrine also bars 
interest deductions under that section of the code.  In Knetsch 
v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960), the Supreme Court held 
                                                           
0Although subsequent subsections of § 163 contain various 
exceptions and qualifications to that rule, it is undisputed that 
an individual taxpayer is entitled to deduct a proportionate 
share of interest expense incurred by a business in which the 
taxpayer is a partner. 
0Among the examples cited by Wexler are the following: Section 
165(c) limits deductible losses under § 165(a) "to (1) losses 
incurred in a trade or business; (2) losses incurred in any 
transaction entered into for profit, though not connected with a 
trade or business . . .."  Under § 167(a), a taxpayer may deduct 
depreciation "(1) of property used in a trade or business, or (2) 
of property held for the production of income."  Likewise, § 212 
allows deductions of expenses "incurred during the taxable year 
(1) for the production or the collection of income; (2) for the 
management, conservation or maintenance of property held for the 
production of income . . .."   
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that interest deductions under the relevant language of § 163(a) 
of the 1954 Code (and the identical language of the predecessor 
provision, § 23(b) of the 1939 Code0) are not permissible when 
the underlying transaction is determined to have been a sham. 
Knetsch purchased $4,000,000 worth of 30-year, deferred annuity, 
bonds carrying a 2.5% interest rate.  He borrowed the $4,000,000 
purchase price at a rate of 3.5%, pledging the bonds as security 
for the loan.  In each of the two years at issue, Knetsch paid 
the interest on the loan balance, and received a loan in the 
amount of the increased value of the annuity bonds.  The Court 
found that he paid a total of $294,570 in interest, and received 
$203,000 in loans.  Knetsch's net out-of-pocket costs were thus 
$91,570.  Meanwhile, the equity value of the annuity bonds -- the 
amount by which the value of the bonds exceeded Knetsch's debt --
was only $1000.  The Court found that, apart from tax benefits, 
the only benefit from Knetsch's $91,570 out-of-pocket expenditure 
was "the relative pittance" of $1000.  Id. at 366.  The Court 
concluded that Knetsch's expenditures "did not appreciably affect 
his beneficial interest except to reduce his tax", and that there 
was "nothing of substance to be realized by Knetsch from this 
transaction beyond a tax deduction."  Id.  The Court therefore 
held that the loan transactions were shams and disallowed 
Knetsch's interest deductions.   
                                                           
0The old § 23(b) is identical to the modern § 163, and was simply 
renumbered upon enactment of the 1954 Code.  See Knetsch, 364 
U.S. at 362 & n.1.  The language is unchanged in § 163 of the 
1986 Code. 
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 Wexler does not undertake to address Knetsch in his 
brief.  Yet Knetsch plainly contradicts respondent's claim that a 
sham transaction can give rise to deductions under § 163.  So do 
many other cases.  The seminal sham-transaction case of Goldstein 
v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2nd Cir. 1966), specifically 
addressed deduction of interest expenses pursuant to § 163(a). 
Id. at 736.  The underlying transaction involved a sweepstakes 
winner who borrowed money at 4.0% to purchase bonds yielding 
1.5%, and then tried to deduct the interest payments on the loan 
from her taxable winnings.  Notwithstanding the lack of an 
explicit requirement of a profit motive or business purpose in 
the text of § 163, the Second Circuit ruled the deduction invalid 
because the interest had arisen from a transaction entered into 
"without any realistic expectation of profit and 'solely' in 
order to secure a large interest deduction".  Id. at 740. 
 In Lifschultz v. Commissioner, 393 F.2d 232 (2nd Cir. 
1968), the court disallowed interest deductions under § 163 for 
five transactions because the transactions were entered into 
without expectation of economic profit and had no purpose beyond 
creating tax deductions.  The Second Circuit ruled that "the 
controverted payments did not constitute interest within the 
meaning of Section 163(a) and were not deductible."  Id. at 234.  
Similarly, in Lukens v. Commissioner, 945 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 
1991), the Fifth Circuit upheld denial of an interest deduction 
under § 163 where the trial court had reasonably found that 
"'petitioners did not have a profit objective, independent of tax 
savings'" for engaging in the underlying transaction.  Id. at 100 
17 
(quoting trial court opinion); See also United States v. Manko, 
979 F.2d 900, 910-11 (2nd Cir. 1992) (approving, in dicta, jury 
instruction that would bar interest deduction if underlying 
transaction did not involve profit potential or market risk).   
 The Ninth Circuit has likewise held that a sham 
transaction cannot generate genuine indebtedness for § 163 
purposes.  Shirar v. Commissioner, 916 F.2d 1414, 1417 (9th Cir. 
1990).  The Shirar court stated that "ordinarily" § 163 permits 
interest paid on indebtedness to be deducted, but only if the 
interest is paid on genuine indebtedness.  Id.  Citing Knetsch, 
the court held that no genuine indebtedness can result from a 
sham transaction, which it defined as a transaction from which 
"there is nothing of substance to be realized beyond a tax 
deduction."  Id.    
 The Tax Court has also disallowed § 163 deductions 
where the underlying transaction constituted an economic sham. In 
Sheldon v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 738 (1990), the court addressed 
the question of whether interest obligations from repo 
transactions very similar to those Wexler allegedly engaged in 
could be deducted under § 163.  The court acknowledged that under 
§ 163 deductibility is not expressly contingent upon a profit 
objective in the underlying transaction.  Id. at 760.  The court 
held, however, that interest is nonetheless not deductible when 
it has resulted from a transaction that lacked economic substance 
-- i.e. had no "'purpose, substance or utility apart from [its] 
18 
anticipated tax consequences.'"  Id. at 761 (quoting Goldstein, 
364 F.2d at 740).0  
 While there is no case in this court that specifically 
addresses the deductibility under § 163 of interest payments on 
sham transactions, we have addressed whether economic shams could 
create deductible interest payments under § 23(b) of the 1939 
Internal Revenue Code, the predecessor of § 163.  Weller 
v.Commissioner, 270 F.2d 294 (3rd Cir. 1959).  The issue in 
Weller -- a case decided a year before Knetsch -- was the 
deductibility of prepaid interest on annuity contract loans.  We 
found that "although in form the payments appear to constitute 
interest within the meaning of section 23(b) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1939, the entire transaction lacks substance." 
Id. at 296.  We cited Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), 
for the general principle that no tax benefit could be created by 
a transaction entered into for no economic benefit other than tax 
avoidance.  Weller, 270 F.2d at 296-97.  Noting that Gregory 
involved what the Supreme Court termed "an elaborate and devious 
form of conveyance masquerading as a corporate reorganization," a 
camouflage the Court declined to recognize for tax purposes 
                                                           
0As the government notes, Sheldon actually expanded the sham 
transaction doctrine, because it barred interest deductions from 
arrangements motivated by tax benefits even if the transactions 
could have generated a profit.  The dissent argued that repo 
transactions with profit potential should be recognized for tax 
purposes.  Id. at 774-75.  The dissent agreed with the majority, 
however, that repos-to-maturity that assure lack of profit do not 
give rise to deductible interest.  Id.  Thus, the Sheldon court 
was unanimous that the kind of transactions Wexler is charged 
with arranging cannot create tax deductions, regardless of 
whether there was "genuine indebtedness".  
19 
because to do so "would be to exalt artifice above reality."  293 
U.S. at 470.  We said in Weller that "the principle laid down in 
the Gregory case is not limited to corporate reorganizations, but 
rather applies to the federal taxing statutes generally."  Id. at 
297.  We rejected the petitioners' argument that the deduction 
should be allowed because the interest obligation was real: "That 
there may be an obligation which is binding under local law is 
not determinative of whether there is a true indebtedness within 
the meaning of Section 23(b)."  Id. at 298. 
 In Weller, we held that interest payments are not 
deductible where the underlying transaction has no purpose other 
than tax avoidance, despite the fact that § 23(b) -- now § 163(a) 
-- had no express business-purpose requirement.  We also held in 
Weller that the existence of a real obligation to pay interest --
which is how Wexler defines "genuine indebtedness" -- does not 
change the result.  Weller remains good law.  Our recent 
treatment of the sham transaction doctrine in Lerman states that 
transactions with no economic significance apart from tax 
benefits lack economic substance.  939 F.2d at 48 & n.6.  To be 
sure, Lerman did not involve § 163; but we stated in Lerman that 
"economic substance is a prerequisite to any Code provisions 
allowing deductions."  939 F.2d at 52 (second emphasis added). We 
thus find no merit in Wexler's argument that economic substance 
in the underlying transaction is not required for deductibility 
under § 163. 
 3) Alleged changes in the law:  Wexler argues that 
recent decisions of the Fourth and Second Circuits and of the Tax 
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Court reflect a modern trend towards a genuine indebtedness 
exception for § 163 deductions -- an exception that the district 
court was correct to follow.  In making this argument, Wexler 
relies heavily on Rice's Toyota World v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 
89 (4th Cir. 1985), a Fourth Circuit opinion also relied on by 
the district court in fashioning the jury instruction to which 
the government has taken such strong exception.   
 Rice's Toyota, an automobile dealership, purchased a 
used computer from a leasing company by issuing a recourse note 
and two non-recourse notes to the seller.  Rice's Toyota leased 
the computer back to the leasing company, and then declared tax 
deductions for depreciation of the computer and for interest paid 
on the recourse and non-recourse notes.  The Fourth Circuit 
affirmed the Tax Court's finding that Rice's transaction was a 
sham because "Rice subjectively lacked a business purpose and the 
transaction objectively lacked economic substance."  Id. at 95. 
After finding that in substance Rice had not purchased a 
computer, but rather had paid a fee in exchange for tax benefits, 
the court went on to examine whether any part of the overall 
scheme was economically substantive.  Id.  The court agreed that 
the capital depreciation and the interest on the non-recourse 
notes should not be deductible.  Id.  However, the Fourth Circuit 
disagreed with the Tax Court's disallowance of the interest paid 
on the recourse note.  The appellate court held that, despite the 
sham nature of the underlying transaction, Rice's Toyota 
purchased "something of economic value", and characterized "the 
'cash payment' on the recourse note as a 'fee' for purchase of 
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expected tax benefits."  Id. at 96.  The court held that the 
installment payments on the recourse notes were "genuine 
obligations" and that the "interest due upon their payment was 
equally an obligation of economic substance."  Id. at 96.  Wexler 
argues that Rice's Toyota therefore allows deduction of interest 
so long as it was paid on an enforceable obligation. 
 We reject Rice's Toyota as authority for the 
instruction adopted by the district court for three reasons.  
 First, the Fourth Circuit did not hold that interest 
was deductible in the absence of economic substance.  Rather, the 
court expressly based deductibility of the recourse note interest 
on a finding that the recourse debt was "an obligation of 
economic substance,"  Id. at 96 -- a finding which, if warranted, 
would of course mean that the interest paid on the recourse note 
was properly deductible. 
 Second, and more important, we are unable to reconcile 
the Fourth Circuit's finding that the recourse note was "an 
obligation of economic substance" with its definition of 
"economic substance".  According to the Fourth Circuit, "economic 
substance" involves "a reasonable possibility of profit from the 
transaction . . . apart from tax benefits."  Id. at 94.  The 
court held, however, that the recourse note transaction had 
economic substance because Rice's payment on the note was a 
"purchase of something of economic value . . . a 'fee' for 
purchase of expected tax benefits."  Id. at 96.  By the Fourth 
Circuit's own definition of economic substance, we do not see how 
22 
the recourse note payment could possess economic substance given 
that the only purpose or gain was the tax benefit.   
 Third and finally, even if we were to accept 
respondent's interpretation of Rice's Toyota, Wexler's case is 
distinguishable from Rice's.  The Fourth Circuit unbundled the 
sale-leaseback transaction and found that one small part of it, 
the recourse note, was economically substantive.  Rice's 
transaction was unusual because the interest payments on the 
recourse note were separable from the interest payments and 
depreciation that would have created the principal tax benefits 
of the transaction.  It appears that the Fourth Circuit did not 
view the interest expense on the recourse note as being, in 
itself, the purpose of Rice's transaction.  The chief intended 
benefits of the sale-leaseback arrangement were the much larger 
deductions for depreciation and interest on the non-recourse 
notes.  The court disallowed those larger deductions.   
 Wexler's case differs in a critical respect.  There is 
no debt obligation that can be separated from the underlying repo 
scheme or that was undertaken for some reason other than the tax 
benefits of deducting interest on that obligation itself.  The 
obligation that Wexler argues to be an economically substantive 
"genuine indebtedness", the loan secured by the government 
securities, is the very obligation that will generate the 
interest payments constituting the tax benefits of the entire 
transaction.  Thus, if we were to follow Rice's Toyota, the 
transaction would be examined for a binding debt obligation even 
if the jury had found that Wexler's transaction was devoid of 
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business purpose or profit potential other than tax avoidance --
i.e. that, by the Fourth Circuit's own definition, the 
transaction was without economic substance.  If such an 
obligation were found -- i.e. that the MBM partnership was 
obligated to pay interest on the loan secured by the government 
securities -- then the interest would be deductible because, 
under Rice's Toyota, it represents a fee paid for economically 
valuable tax benefits, thereby giving the transaction economic 
substance.  We think such an outcome would undermine the sham 
transaction doctrine, for it would allow the MBM partnership to 
reap the entire tax benefit of its sham transaction simply 
because MBM was contractually obligated to make payments on the 
loan that was the centerpiece of the whole scheme.  Such an 
outcome would be incompatible with the holdings of Weller, 
Knetsch, Gregory, Goldstein, and Lerman.  This may explain why, 
five years after Rice's Toyota, the sixteen Tax Court judges 
deciding Sheldon v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 738 (1990), all agreed 
that interest payments related to a sham transaction cannot be 
deducted under § 163.0 
 Respondent argues that several recent decisions have 
followed Rice's Toyota on the genuine indebtedness issue, 
reflecting a current trend in the law.  For example, Wexler cites 
Jacobson v. Commissioner, 915 F.2d 832 (2nd Cir. 1990), as 
evidence that the Second Circuit has abandoned Goldstein and now 
                                                           
0The Tax Court was well aware of Rice's Toyota when it decided 
Sheldon.  94 T.C. 760 (citing Rice's Toyota and noting that the 
Fourth Circuit had allowed deduction of the interest paid on the 
recourse debt). 
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allows deductions of interest payments notwithstanding an 
underlying sham transaction.  But the Jacobson opinion does not 
support Wexler's argument.   
 In Jacobson, the court stated that "[e]ven if the 
motive for a transaction is to avoid taxes, interest incurred 
therein may still be deductible if it relates to economically 
substantive indebtedness."  915 F.2d at 840 (citing Rice's 
Toyota).  The government does not quarrel with that formulation 
here: indeed, the two-part definition of a sham transaction 
proposed by the government and adopted by the district court 
would require the jury, in order to "find the transactions were 
sham transactions," to "determine two things beyond a reasonable 
doubt:"   
First, that MBM had no business purpose for entering 
into the transactions other than to obtain tax 
benefits; and 
 
Second, that there was no economic substance to the 
transaction, that is there was no reasonable 
possibility that MBM could earn a profit on the 
transactions apart from tax benefits. 
Thus, what Jacobson holds is that interest will be deductible 
where the government proves lack of business purpose, but cannot 
prove lack of economic substance -- i.e. if the underlying 
transaction is not a "sham" as defined by the district court's 
order in Wexler's case.0   
                                                           
0We find it difficult to believe that, had the Second Circuit 
intended anything more -- i.e. to allow deductions of any 
interest that actually had to be paid -- it would have done so 
without explicitly addressing and overruling its oft-cited 
Goldstein decision.  That it had no intention of doing so is 
evidenced by a Second Circuit case decided just six weeks before 
Jacobson, by a panel including two judges (Newman and Pratt, JJ) 
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   Respondent also relies heavily on the Tax Court's 
recent decision in Lieber v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 722 
(1993).  In Lieber, the court addressed, inter alia, the 
deductibility of interest obligations incurred in connection with 
a computer purchase and lease transaction.  The Tax Court first 
cited its own opinion in Rose v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 386, 423 
(1987), aff'd. 868 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1989), in which it had 
stated that under § 163 a taxpayer may deduct interest payments 
even absent a tax-independent motive for the underlying 
transaction.  The Tax Court in Lieber went on, however, to 
acknowledge that its Rose dictum was in conflict with its more 
recent ruling in Sheldon that transactions "give rise to 
deductible interest only if there is some tax-independent purpose 
for the transactions."  Sheldon, 94 T.C. at 759.   
 Contrary to Wexler's argument, the Tax Court in Lieber 
did not reject Sheldon in favor of Rose, but expressly decided 
not to resolve the tension between Rose and Sheldon.  Rather, it 
decided that, because an appeal in Lieber would be to the Second 
Circuit, which in the Tax Court's view had adopted the Rose 
dictum in Jacobson0, the Tax Court would follow Rose in Lieber. 
Thus, the Tax Court did not decide which position was correct, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of the three judges who decided Jacobson, in which the court 
stated that "[t]hough . . . a 'repo to maturity' repurchase 
agreement, is legal, it provides no basis for claiming an 
interest expense deduction since no profit or loss can be 
realized in connection with the interest charges."  United States 
v. Oshatz, 912 F.2d 534, 536 (2nd Cir. 1990).   
0As our discussion of Jacobson suggests, typescript, supra, text 
at p.23, and n.11, we are not at all clear that Jacobson should 
be regarded as building in some significant sense on Rose. 
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but rather decided the question with reference to what the Tax 
Court perceived the law to be in the relevant circuit court of 
appeals.  Thus, the only relevance of Lieber to the instant case 
is to indicate that, were the instant case one that had arisen in 
the Tax Court, that court would have decided the issue at bar 
with reference to the prevailing law of the this circuit.  And in 
this circuit, under Weller and Lerman, the interest arising from 
Wexler's transaction is not deductible if the underlying repo 
transaction is a sham. 
 We are convinced that there is no basis for finding 
that interest payments arising from the repo-to-maturity 
transactions allegedly arranged by Wexler should be deductible as 
"genuine indebtedness".  Rice's Toyota, Jacobson and Lieber 
indicate that, in some circumstances, a sham transaction may have 
separable, economically substantive, elements that give rise to 
deductible interest obligations.0  Yet in each of those cases a 
key requirement is that the interest obligation be economically 
substantive, defined in every decision except Rose to mean that 
the transaction have a potential non-tax benefit.  The jury 
instruction that the district court adopted in its November 30, 
1993, Order goes even further: if, pursuant to the sham 
transaction instruction, the jury were to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt both "no business purpose . . . other than to 
obtain tax benefits" and "no economic substance [because] there 
                                                           
0Wexler cites no case in which the very interest comprising the 
entire tax benefit of a sham transaction has been ruled 
deductible as "genuine indebtedness". 
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was no reasonable probability [of] a profit . . . apart from tax 
benefits," deductibility would still follow unless the government 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt the "lack of genuine 
indebtedness."0  We find that this instruction would render the 
sham transaction doctrine inert, and that the instruction is at 
odds with the overwhelming weight of the relevant case law.     
 4) Clear error in the November 30, 1990, Order:  On the 
basis of the foregoing discussion, we find that the "genuine 
indebtedness" instruction adopted by the district court 
constitutes clear error under established law.  This circuit held 
in Weller that interest payments arising from a sham transaction 
are not deductible.  270 F. 2d at 296-98.  Our rule of 
disregarding sham transactions for federal taxation purposes 
continues in full force today, with no exception for § 163 
deductions.  Lerman, 939 F.2d at 48 & n.6, 52 ("economic 
substance is a prerequisite to any Code provisions allowing 
deductions") (second emphasis added); see also Peerless 
Industries v. United States, 1994 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 411 *17, 94-1 
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶50,043 (E.D.Pa. 1994), (§ 163 "deduction is 
proper if there is some substance to the loan arrangement beyond 
. . . the deduction.").  The jury instruction adopted by the 
district court in its November 30, 1993, Order conflicts with the 
established law of this circuit, and with the dominant line of 
precedent following the Supreme Court's ruling in Knetsch and the 
Second Circuit's ruling in Goldstein. 
                                                           
0
"Genuine indebtedness" being defined by the district court as 
simply "a binding obligation . . . to pay interest on a loan." 
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Whether a writ of mandamus should issue   
 The standard for issuing a writ of mandamus is 
stringent.  As a threshold matter, the petitioner must prove that 
the district court committed a "clear abuse of discretion", 
Mallard v. U.S. District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 309 (1989), or a 
"clear error of law", In Re Bankers Trust Co., 775 F.2d 545, 547 
(3rd Cir. 1985).  We have found that the government has met that 
burden in this case.   
 In addition to demonstrating clear error, however, the 
petitioner must generally show that, other than mandamus, it has 
no means of adequate relief, Bankers Trust, 775 F.2d at 547, and 
that the error will cause irreparable injury, Cippolone v. 
Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1118 (3rd Cir. 1986).   
 We find in this case that the government has no 
alternative avenue of relief.  The government sought rehearing on 
the intended jury instructions, but rehearing was denied.  For 
double-jeopardy reasons, no appeal will be possible once trial 
begins.  The government will not be able to interrupt the trial 
by filing an appeal or a renewed petition for mandamus when the 
district judge commences to give the erroneous instruction.  And 
if -- as the government anticipates, and Wexler does not contest 
-- jury deliberations guided by the erroneous instruction end in 
an acquittal, the injury to the government will be irremediable.0 
                                                           
0This would be so even if the district court, without submitting 
the case to the jury, granted a motion by defendant, pursuant to 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a), for acquittal after the close of the 
government's evidence. 
29 
 We are mindful of respondent's argument that mandamus 
is an extraordinary remedy, reserved for rare circumstances.  We 
believe, however, that this case presents an appropriate occasion 
for exercise of the writ.  Not only do we find clear error, 
likelihood of irreparable harm, and lack of alternatives, but we 
also note the absence of certain factors that would weigh against 
mandamus.  A principal concern with mandamus is that it not be 
used as a substitute for appeal.  In Re School Asbestos 
Litigation, 977 F.2d 764, 772 (3rd Cir. 1992).  Indeed, 
"[m]andamus is disfavored because its broad use would threaten 
the policy against piecemeal appeals."  Id.  In the case at bar, 
issuance of the writ will neither substitute for appeal nor bring 
this case piecemeal to this court, for the simple reason that 
appeal from the erroneous instruction is not an option for the 
government.0 
                                                           
0Wexler also argues that issuance of a writ in this case would 
contravene the Criminals Appeals Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3731, and Will 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 90 (1967), which mandates that 
"mandamus may never be employed as a substitute for appeal in 
derogation of the" principle that the "Criminal Appeals Act is 
strictly construed against the Government's right of appeal." Id. 
at 96-97.  Will, however, does not preclude the use of mandamus 
to review an interlocutory order that expresses an erroneous, 
preliminary jury instruction.  In Will, the Court states that it 
would not "say that mandamus may never be used to review 
procedural orders in criminal cases."  Id. at 97. Moreover, the 
Court stated that "it need not decide under what circumstances, 
if any," a court may review "an interlocutory procedural order . 
. . which did not have the effect of a dismissal."  Id. at 98.  
While it might be difficult to characterize a jury instruction as 
procedural, still under Will the mandamus door is open far enough 
to include jury instructions. 
 
   Accordingly, while we do not attempt to set forth the exact 
parameters of when mandamus is available to address interlocutory 
orders in criminal cases, we do find that on the facts of this 
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 Wexler would cabin our discretion to order mandamus to 
situations in which a district court either exceeded its lawful 
jurisdiction or declined to exercise a non-discretionary power. 
While those two situations constitute traditional reasons for the 
writ, they are not exclusive.  Indeed, we have observed that 
"courts have not confined themselves to any narrow or technical 
definition of the term 'jurisdiction'"  in using the writ to 
regulate proceedings in the district court.  United States v. 
Santtini, 963 F.2d 585, 594 (3rd Cir. 1992).  Accordingly, 
mandamus may issue to correct clear abuses of discretion, to 
further "supervisory and instructional goals", and to resolve 
"unsettled and important" issues.  In Re School Asbestos 
Litigation, 977 F.2d at 773.  While appellate courts must be 
parsimonious with the writ, it is also true that "[s]ome 
flexibility is required if the extraordinary writ is to remain 
available for extraordinary situations."  Id.   
 We find that the adoption of a clearly erroneous jury 
instruction that entails a high probability of failure of a 
prosecution -- a failure the government could not then seek to 
remedy by appeal or otherwise -- constitutes the kind of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
case mandamus is appropriate.  Accepting the government's 
assertion that our failure to exercise mandamus review over the 
order would hamper the government's ability to enforce the tax 
laws, we find that this interlocutory order presents a special 
situation which militates in favor of mandamus review.  We must 
acknowledge, however, that our granting the writ in this context 
does not authorize the use of mandamus whenever the government 
objects to criminal jury instructions.  Rather, our decision is 
limited to the facts of this case. 
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extraordinary situation in which we are empowered to issue the 
writ of mandamus.  Accordingly, the petition for a writ of 
mandamus is granted, the district court is directed to vacate its 
order of November 30, 1993, and the proceedings in the underlying 
case shall be consistent with this opinion.  
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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 
 
 I join in the opinion of the court because I believe 
that it correctly states the substantive tax law and because I 
further believe that it is appropriate for us to exercise our 
mandamus jurisdiction to direct the correction of the error in 
the proposed charge.  Nevertheless I do so with some reluctance 
because I have difficulty reconciling Wexler's prosecution with 
the principles underlying Cheek v. United States, 111 S.Ct. 604 
(1991).  In its petition for mandamus the government tells us 
that "the district court's order adopts an erroneous jury 
instruction predicated on a fundamentally incorrect reading of 
the tax law [which] if not corrected by this Court . . . will 
force the government to dismiss the charges . . . ."  Petition at 
1.  Thus, the government explains, the "incorrect instruction 
would virtually preclude the government from obtaining a 
conviction [as] it would leave [it] with no means of proving a 
critical element of its case -- that the interest deductions at 
issue were invalid."  Petition at 2.  The government adheres to 
this position in its reply brief, asserting that the district 
court's error "will force the government to dismiss the criminal 
charges."  Reply brief at 4.  In the circumstances, it is evident 
that the government's trial problem is that the district court 
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intends to charge the jury that the deductions involved in this 
case were not unlawful, and the government quite understandably 
feels that in the face of that charge it cannot be successful at 
trial. 
 What bothers me in the government's position is that it 
is challenging a conclusion reached by the district court in a 
carefully crafted formal, though unpublished opinion, rendered 
after the court considered the appropriate authorities, including 
some of the very cases we cite, e.g., Lerman v. Comm'r, 939 F.2d 
44 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1940 (1992). 
Furthermore, the district court adhered to its conclusion on 
reconsideration.  Therefore, Wexler is being prosecuted in a case 
in which the government intends to demonstrate that he acted in 
what the district court believed was a lawful manner.  This 
circumstance almost has caused me to vote to deny the 
government's petition.   
 In Cheek the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he 
proliferation of statutes and regulations has sometimes made it 
difficult for the average citizen to know and comprehend the 
extent of the duties and obligations imposed by the tax laws." 
111 S.Ct. at 609.  Thus, "[i]n the end [in a criminal case] the 
issue is whether, based on all the evidence, the Government has 
proved that the defendant was aware of the duty at issue, which 
cannot be true if the jury credits a good-faith misunderstanding 
and belief submission, whether or not the claimed belief or 
misunderstanding is objectively reasonable."  Id. at 611.  The 
Supreme Court's formulation throws into question the fairness of 
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Wexler's prosecution for even the district court did not believe 
that Wexler violated "the duty at issue."  Thus, I have 
considered whether, notwithstanding the government's 
demonstration of a prima facie case for the issuance of a writ of 
mandamus, we should not exercise our discretion by denying its 
application.  See In re School Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 772 
(3d Cir. 1992).  
 However, I ultimately do join in the opinion for I do 
not question the government's good faith in instituting the 
criminal case as I have no doubt that it was surprised by the 
legal conclusions reached by the district court, and, on the 
limited record before us, I do not know all the circumstances 
which led the government to seek Wexler's indictment. 
Furthermore, I cannot possibly fault the government for seeking a 
writ of mandamus from this court as I accept its representation 
that, unless corrected, the district court's unreported opinion 
will be circulated and will stand as an impediment to the 
enforcement of the tax laws.  Of course, now that the government 
has obtained its goal of overcoming the district court's opinion, 
the determination whether this criminal case should be continued 
must be made by the prosecuting authorities and not by this 
court. 
 I close, however, by pointing out that our opinion is 
narrow.  We only give directions with respect to the charge to 
the jury.  Accordingly, we do not address the possibility that 
Wexler may in some way be able to bring to the jury's attention 
the district court's opinion to support a contention that he 
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acted in good faith with respect to the transactions and the 
deductions involved.  That issue, however, is not before us and 
consequently I express no opinion with respect to it. 
